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Abstract
We develop the theory and practice of an approach to modeling and probabilistic in-
ference in causal networks that is suitable when application-specific or analysis-specific
constraints should inform such inference or when little or no data for the learning
of causal network structure or probability values at nodes are available. Constrained
Bayesian Networks generalize a Bayesian Network such that probabilities can be sym-
bolic, arithmetic expressions and where the meaning of the network is constrained by
finitely many formulas from the theory of the reals. A formal semantics for constrained
Bayesian Networks over first-order logic of the reals is given, which enables non-linear
and non-convex optimization algorithms that rely on decision procedures for this logic,
and supports the composition of several constrained Bayesian Networks. A non-trivial
case study in arms control, where few or no data are available to assess the effective-
ness of an arms inspection process, evaluates our approach. An open-access prototype
implementation of these foundations and their algorithms uses the SMT solver Z3 as
decision procedure, leverages an open-source package for Bayesian inference to symbolic
computation, and is evaluated experimentally.
Keywords: Bayesian Belief Network. Imprecise Probabilities. Lack of Prior Data. Non-
Linear Optimization. Confidence Building in Nuclear Arms Control.
1 Introduction
Bayesian Networks (BN) [36, 37, 35] are a prominent, well established, and widely used for-
malism for expressing discrete probability distributions in terms of directed, acyclic graphs
(DAG) that encode conditional independence assumptions of distributions. Bayesian Net-
works have a wide range of applications – for example, trouble shooting [12], design of
experiments [30, 28], and digital forensics to support legal reasoning [38]. Their graph-based
formalism and automated support for probabilistic inference seem to lower adaption hurdles
for a diverse set of users with different technical backgrounds. Bayesian Networks are also
appealing since we may combine, within the same Bayesian Network, different aspects such
as subjective beliefs expressed in probabilities, implicit trust assumptions reflected in a bias
of information processing or the combinatorial logic of a process. Probabilistic inference for
such combinations is supported, including belief updates based on observed evidence.
Bayesian Networks also come with methodological support for learning an appropriate
graph structure as well as appropriate prior probability values at nodes in such graphs from
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pre-existing data (see for example [29, 19]). The appropriateness of chosen prior probability
values may depend on a variety of factors: the quality and quantity of data used for learning
these values or the trust we place in experts who determine such values subjectively – to give
two examples. We would therefore like reassurance that the prior distributions represented
by such values are robust enough in that small changes to such values only result in small
changes of posterior distributions of interest. This naturally leads to the consideration of
robust Bayesian statistics [9, 10].
A popular idea here is to approximate prior probabilities with intervals and to then calcu-
late – somehow – the intervals that correspond to posterior probabilities. A good conceptual
explanation of this is Good’s black box model [26, 27], in which interval information of priors
is submitted into a black box that contains all the usual methods associated with precise
computations in Bayesian Networks, and where the box then outputs intervals of posteriors
without limiting any interpretations or judgments on those output intervals.
Our engagement with a problem owner in arms control made us realize the benefits of
Good’s black box model and made us identify opportunities for extending it to increase the
confidence that users from such problem domains can place in models and their robustness.
Specifically, we want to be able to
R1 re-interpret compactly a BN as a possibly infinite set of BNs over the same graph, with
robustness being analyzable over that re-interpretation
R2 add logical constraints to capture domain knowledge or dependencies, and reflect con-
straints in robustness analyses in a coherent manner
R3 compare models, within a composition context, to determine any differences in the
robustness that they may offer for supporting decision making
R4 parametrize the use of such a box so that it can produce outputs for any quantitative
measure of interest definable as an arithmetic term
R5 retain the “blackness” of the box so that the user neither has to see nor has to under-
stand its inner workings
R6 interpret outputs of the black box within the usual methodology of Bayesian Networks
in as far as this may be possible.
We believe that these requirements are desired or apt in a wide range of problem domains,
in addition to the fact that they should enhance usability of such a methodology in prac-
tice. We develop constrained Bayesian Networks in this paper and show that they meet the
above requirements. This development is informed by advances made in areas of Symbolic
Computation [34] and Automated Theorem Proving [23] (with its applications to Non-Linear,
Non-Convex Optimization [8]), Three-Valued Model Checking [13], and Abstract Interpreta-
tion [15]. Concretely, we allow prior probabilities to be arithmetic expressions that may
contain variables, and we enrich this model with logical constraints expressed in the theory
of the reals.
We draw comparisons to related work, including Credal Networks [16, 22, 33] and Con-
straint Networks [24]. We then highlight similarities, differences, and complementary value
of our approach to this previous work.
2
Contributions and methodology of the paper We develop a formal syntax and se-
mantics of constrained Bayesian Networks which denote an empty, finite or infinite set of
Bayesian Networks over the same directed acyclic graph. We support this concept with a
composition operator in which two or more constrained Bayesian Networks with different or
“overlapping” graphs may be combined for cross-model analysis, subject to constraints that
are an optional parameter of that composition. We formulate a three-valued semantics of the
theory of the reals over constrained BNs that captures the familiar duality of satisfiability and
validity but over the set of Bayesian Networks that a constrained Bayesian Network denotes.
This semantics is used to reduce the computation of its judgments to satisfiability checks in
the first-order logic over the reals. We then apply that reduction to design optimization al-
gorithms that can compute, for any term definable in that logic, infima and suprema up to a
specified accuracy – for example for terms that specify the meaning of marginal probabilities
symbolically. These optimization algorithms and their term parameter allow us to explore
or verify the robustness of a constrained Bayesian Network including, but not limited to, the
robustness of posterior distributions. We demonstrate the use of such extended robustness
analyses on a non-trivial case study in the domain of arms control. We also report a tool
prototype that we have implemented and used to conduct these analyses; it uses an SMT
solver as a feasibility checker to implement these optimization algorithms; and it adapts an
open-source package for Bayesian inference to symbolic computations.
Our principal theoretical contribution is the introduction of the concept of a Constrained
Bayesian Network itself, as well as its intuitive yet formal semantics. Our theoretical results,
such as those for computational complexity and algorithm design, follow rather straightfor-
wardly from these definitions. This is because the latter allow us to appeal directly to existing
results from the existential theory of the reals and optimization based thereupon.
Our main practical contribution is the successful integration of a number of disparate
techniques and approaches into a coherent semantic framework and tool prototype that sup-
ports a range of modelling and analysis capabilities, and does so in a highly automated
manner.
2 Background on Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian Network (BN) is a graph-based statistical model for expressing and reasoning
about probabilistic uncertainty. The underlying graph is directed and acyclic, a DAG. Nodes
in this DAG represent random variables defined by discrete probability distributions that are
also a function of the random variables represented by the parent nodes in the DAG. In other
words, a random variable is conditioned on the random variables of its parent nodes.
We can use a BN to compute probabilities for events of interest over these random vari-
ables. Bayesian inference also allows us to revise such probabilities when additional observa-
tions of “evidence” have been made.
Figure 1 shows a simple BN, which is part of the folklore of example Bayesian Networks.
It depicts the possible causes of wet grass on two neighbours’ lawns. For example, the
probabilities of Holmes’ Grass Wet is conditioned on its parents’ output – whether It Rains
and Holmes’ Sprinkler is turned On or Off. The probability of Holmes’ Grass Wet = T, given
that Holmes’ Sprinkler = Off, Rain = F, for instance, is computed to be 0.05, and is formally
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Holmes’
Sprinkler
Holmes’
Grass Wet
It Rains
Watson’s
Grass Wet
Sprinkler
On Off
0.1 0.9
Watson’s
It Rains T F
F 0.05 0.95
T 0.7 0.3
It Rains
T F
0.2 0.8
Holmes’s
Sprinkler/It Rains T F
Off F 0.05 0.95
Off T 0.7 0.3
On F 0.95 0.05
On T 0.99 0.01
Figure 1: A BN with a 4-node DAG in the center and probability tables next to the respective
nodes. This BN models beliefs about possible causes of wet grass on two neighbours’ lawns.
This BN allows us to reason about, for example, whether Holmes’ lawn being wet is due to
rain or Holmes’ sprinkler – using observed evidence about a neighbour’s lawn.
stated as:
ppHolmes’ Grass Wet = T | Sprinkler = Off, Rain = Fq “ 0.05
This approach naturally gives cause to computations of the “overall” probability of an
event happening, referred to as the marginal probability. In the Bayesian approach, the
Junction Tree Algorithm (JTA) (see e.g. Chapter 6 in [6] for further details) may be used
to revise a marginal of a BN because of “hard”, respectively “soft”, evidence – the definite,
respectively probabilistic, observation of an additional or new event.
We now formalize BNs and use this below to enrich BNs with modeling and reasoning
capabilities that realize the aforementioned requirements.
Definition 1 1. A Bayesian network (BN) is a pair pG, piq where G is a finite, directed,
acyclic graph G “ pN,Eq of nodes N and edge relation E Ă N ˆN , and where pi is a
tuple ppinqnPN of formal probability tables.
2. The formal probability table pin is defined as follows. Let pntpnq “ tn1 P N | pn1, nq P Eu
be the (possibly empty) set of parents of n in DAG G and On the set of outcomes of the
random variable at node n. Then pin is a discrete probability distribution, a function
pin of type
`ś
n1PpntpnqOn1
˘ˆOn Ñ r0, 1s such that its mass ře pinpeq equals 1.
Above, it is understood that
ś
n1PHOn1 equals t˚u; in that case, pin has type isomorphic
to On Ñ r0, 1s.
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Sprinkler
On Off
0.5˚x 1´ 0.5˚x
Rain
T F
x 1´ x
Figure 2: Probability tables that make a constrained BN BC0X0 out of the BN B in Figure 1 by
entering non-constant terms into tables Sprinkler and Rain. Marginal probabilities of interest
are those given in (1) and (2) and their meaning is defined as constraints in (3) and (4)
3 Constrained Bayesian Networks
Informally, a constrained BN is obtained from a BN by replacing one or more probabilities
in its probability tables with symbolic expressions, and by adding constraints for variables
used in these expressions or in quantitative terms of interest, and for variables that refer to
marginal probabilities of interest. We write BCX for constrained BN with set of constraints C
and variable set X.
To illustrate, in Figure 2 the probability tables for two nodes Sprinkler and Rain of the
BN in Figure 1 are made symbolic with a variable x to obtain a constrained BN. This allows
us to model strict uncertainty (also known as Knightian uncertainty) in the actual value of
such probabilities. Our approach allows variables to be shared across such tables, as x is
shared across the tables for Sprinkler and Rain. This is certainly useful, e.g., to express that
a certain subjective probability is twice as likely as another one.
We use variables mpH and mpW to refer to marginal probabilities
ppHolmes’ Grass Wet = Trueq (1)
ppHolmes’ Grass Wet = True | Watson’s Grass Wet = Trueq (2)
respectively. The constraints we then consider are 0 ď x ď 1, to ensure that symbolic
expressions still specify probability distributions, as well as the symbolic meaning of the
marginal probabilities mpH and mpW which are captured in two non-linear equations in x
as
mpH “ 0.495˚x˚x` 0.5˚x˚p´0.95˚x` 0.95q `
0.7˚x˚p´0.5˚x` 1q ` 1.0˚p´0.5˚x` 1q˚p´0.05˚x` 0.05q (3)
mpW ˚p0.35˚x˚x` 0.025˚x˚p´0.95˚x` 0.95q ` 0.7˚x˚p´x˚0.5` 1q `
0.025˚x˚p´0.05˚x` 0.05q ` 0.05˚p´0.95˚x` 0.95q˚p´x˚0.5` 1q `
0.05˚p´x˚0.5` 1q˚p´0.05˚x` 0.05qq “
p0.3465˚x˚x` 0.025˚x˚p´0.95˚x` 0.95q ` 0.49˚x˚p´x˚0.5` 1q `
0.05˚p´x˚0.5` 1q˚p´0.05˚x` 0.05qq (4)
The above equations are constructed through symbolic interpretations of computations
of marginals, for example of the Junction Tree Algorithm, and subsequent elimination of
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t ::“ c | mp | x | t` t | t ˚ t
ϕ ::“ true | t ď t | t ă t |  ϕ | ϕ^ ϕ
φ ::“ ϕ | Dx : φ |  φ | φ^ φ
Figure 3: BNF grammars for real-valued terms t, constraints ϕ, and queries φ where x are
variables from set Xx, c are constant reals, mp are variables from set Xmp denoting marginal
probabilities, and true denotes logical truth
division operators. The latter computes a normal form of rational terms from which these
equations are easily derived.
3.1 Theoretical Foundations
We begin the formal development by defining grammars for symbolic expressions that occur
in probability tables and for properties that contain such expressions as arguments. Figure 3
shows definitions for real-valued terms t, where c ranges over real constants, and x and
mp are real variables ranging over variable sets Xx and Xmp, respectively. The distinction
between mp and x is one of modelling intent. Variables mp refer to marginal probabilities
of a constrained BN BCX . The meaning of these symbolic marginals is defined via constraints
in C. Variables in Xx may occur in symbolic expressions in probability tables of nodes or
denote any quantitative measures of interest. We write X “ XxYXmp for the disjoint union
of such variable sets.
Constraints ϕ are quantifier-free formulas built from inequalities over terms t, logical
truth constant true, and propositional operators. Queries φ are built out of constraints and
first-order quantifiers.
Definition 2 We write T rXs for the set of all terms t, CrXs for the set of all constraints
ϕ generated in this manner, and we write QrXs for the set of all queries φ generated in this
manner from variable set X.
We write T , C, and Q whenever X is clear from context and write _, ´, “, ą and so forth
for derived logical, arithmetic, and relational operators.
We may think of a constrained BN BCX as a BN B in which entries in probability tables
of nodes may not only be concrete probabilities but terms t of the grammar in Figure 3 over
variable set Xx, and where the BN is enriched with a finite set of constraints C “ tϕi | 1 ď
i ď nu. The intuition is that BCX denotes a set of BNs that all have the same graph and the
same structure of probability tables but where probability values may be uncertain, modelled
as arithmetic terms, and subject to application-specific or analysis-specific constraints. The
only difference in two BNs from that set may be in the real number entries in those probability
tables, and those real numbers are instantiations of the specified arithmetic terms such that
all constraints are met. We formalize this:
Definition 3 A constrained BN of type pXx, Xmpq – denoted as X “ Xx Y Xmp by abuse
of notation – is a triple pG,C, piq where G “ pN,Eq is a finite DAG, C a finite set of
constraints from CrXs, and pi a tuple ppinqnPN of symbolic probability tables with On as the
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set of outcomes of random variable at node n:
pin :
` ź
n1Ppntpnq
On1
˘ˆOn Ñ T rXxs
Note that a symbolic probability table has the same input type as a formal probability
table, but its output type is a set of terms not the unit interval. Let us first define syntactic
restrictions for constrained BNs.
Definition 4 1. A constrained BN pG,C, piq of type X is well-formed if
(a) X “ Xx YXmp equals the set of variables that occur in C
(b) all mp in Xmp have exactly one defining equation mp “ t or mp˚ t “ t1 in C where
neither t nor t1 contain variables from Xmp.
2. When G and pi are determined by context, we refer to a well-formed, constrained BN
pG,C, piq of type X as BCX .
Item 1(a) says that all variables in X occur in some constraint from C. Item 1(b) ensures
all variables mp that model marginal probabilities have a defined meaning in C. Note that
item 1(b) is consistent with having other constraints on such variables in C, for example a
constraint saying that 0.1 ď mp ď x ˚ y. These items create a two-level term language, with
variables in Xx informing meaning of variables in Xmp.
A sound, constrained BN has a semantic requirement about its concretizations, which we
now formalize using assignments for quantifier-free formulas.
Definition 5 1. An assignment α is a function α : X Ñ R. For c in R and x in X,
assignment αrx ÞÑ cs equals α except at x, where it outputs c.
2. The meaning αptq of term t in T under α, as well as the judgment α |ù φ for all φ in
Q, are defined in Figure 4.
Note that αptq extends α : X Ñ R to type T rXs Ñ R. The judgment α |ù φ is satisfaction
of first-order logic over the reals. We use these judgments to define the set of concretizations
of a well-formed, constrained BN:
Definition 6 Let BCX “ pG,C, piq be a well-formed, constrained BN where G “ pN,Eq. Let
α : X Ñ R be an assignment.
1. We write BCXrαs for the BN pG, pirαsq that forgets C from BCX and has formal probability
table pirαsn for each node n with pirαsn “ λe : αppinpeqq.
2. The set
“|BCX |‰ of BNs that BCX denotes, its set of concretizations, is“|BCX |‰ “ tBCXrαs | α : X Ñ R and α |ù ľ
ϕ1PC
ϕ1u (5)
Note that the formal probability table pirαsn computes pirαsnpeq as αptq where t is the
term pinpeq in T rXxs. We can now define sound constrained BNs.
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αpcq “ c constants denote themselves
αpxq “ αpxq for all x in X, overloading of notation
αpt1 ` t2q “ αpt1q ` αpt2q
αpt1 ˚ t2q “ αpt1q ˚ αpt2q
α |ù true holds
α |ù t1 ď t2 iff αpt1q ď αpt2q
α |ù t1 ă t2 iff αpt1q ă αpt2q
α |ù  ϕ iff pnot α |ù ϕq
α |ù ϕ1 ^ ϕ2 iff pα |ù ϕ1 and α |ù ϕ2q
α |ù Dx : φ iff αrx ÞÑ cs |ù φ for some real number c
α |ù  φ iff pnot α |ù φq
α |ù φ1 ^ φ2 iff pα |ù φ1 and α |ù φ2q
Figure 4: Top: meaning of terms for an assignment α, where we identify constants with their
meaning, and use the same symbol ` for syntax and semantics, and similarly for ˚. Bottom:
Semantics of judgment α |ù φ for an assignment α : X Ñ R and φ from Q. This uses the
meaning αptq from Figure 4 and uses ď both as syntax and semantics, similarly for ă
Definition 7 Let BCX “ pG,C, piq be a well-formed, constrained BN. Then BCX is sound if
for all BCXrαs that are concretizations of BCX we have, for all nodes n and inputs e of pirαsn,
that pirαsnpeq is in r0, 1s and ře pirαsnpeq “ 1.
Soundness is saying that all concretizations of a well-formed, constrained BN are actually
BNs: for each such BCXrαs and node n in it, pirαsn is a discrete probability distribution.
Assumption 1 All constrained BNs used in this paper are sound.
It is important to know whether
“|BCX |‰ is non-empty.
Definition 8 A constrained BCX is consistent iff
“|BCX |‰ ­“ H.
The techniques developed in the next Section 3.2 will also allow us to decide whether a
constrained BN is consistent.
3.2 Semantic Judgments
How should we best reason about a set of BNs
“|BCX |‰? We propose two semantic judgments
that allow us to explore worst-case and best-case properties of BCX . A judicious combination of
these judgments also enables us to express optimizations over the imprecision and probabilis-
tic uncertainty inherent in BCX , whilst reflecting any application-specific or analysis-specific
constraints. Both semantic judgments rest on a satisfaction relation between concretization
BNs and queries. We define this formally.
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Definition 9 Let BCX be a constrained BN. For all φ in Q, the two semantic judgments |ùmust
and |ùmay are defined as
BCX |ùmustφ iff for all BCXrαs in BCX we have α |ù φ (6)
BCX |ùmayφ iff for some BCXrαs in BCX we have α |ù φ (7)
The definition in (6) allows us to discover invariants : truth of BCX |ùmustφ implies that φ
holds no matter what concrete instance in
“|BCX |‰ the modeller may face, a form of worst-case
reasoning. Dually, the truth of BCX |ùmayφ in (7) implies it is possible that the modeller faces
a BN in
“|BCX |‰ that satisfies φ, a form of best-case reasoning. We may formalize this duality.
Theorem 1 For all constrained BNs BCX and φ in Q we have
1. BCX |ùmustφ iff not BCX |ùmay φ
2. BCX |ùmayφ iff not BCX |ùmust φ
3. BCX |ùmustφ1 ^ φ2 iff (BCX |ùmustφ1 and BCX |ùmustφ2)
4. BCX |ùmayφ1 _ φ2 iff (BCX |ùmayφ1 or BCX |ùmayφ2)
We illustrate this formalization of constrained BNs with an example.
Example 1 The constrained BN from Figures 1 and 2 is sound and consistent. Con-
sider the query ϕH being mpH ă 0.3 where we use variable mpH to denote the marginal
probability ppHolmes’ Grass Wet = Trueq. We mean to compute whether BCX |ùmustϕH and
BCX |ùmayϕH hold for this constrained BN. We conclude that BCX |ùmustϕH does not hold:
ppHolmes’ Grass Wet = Trueq equals 0.35255 for αpxq “ 0.3 and so αpmpHq “ 0.35255 as
well, and we have α |ù Źϕ1PC ϕ1 and 0.35255 ę 0.3. On the other hand, BCX |ùmayϕH holds
since for α1pxq “ 0.1 we have α1 |ùŹϕ1PC ϕ1 and α1pmpHq “ 0.15695 is less than or equal to
0.3.
Observing additional hard evidence that Watson’s grass is wet, we similarly evaluate judg-
ments BCX |ùmayϕ and BCX |ùmustϕ when ϕ contains mpW which refers to marginal
ppHolmes’ Grass Wet = True | Watson’s Grass Wet = Trueq
3.3 Consistent constrained BNs
It is important to understand how the semantic judgments |ùmay and |ùmust relate to consistent
or inconsistent constrained BNs. We can characterize consistency through properties of these
semantic judgments:
Theorem 2 Let BCX be a constrained BN. Then the following are all equivalent:
1. BCX |ùmaytrue holds.
2. BCX is consistent.
3. For all φ in Q, we have that BCX |ùmustφ implies BCX |ùmayφ.
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4. For all φ in Q, we have that BCX |ùmayφ_ φ holds.
5. For all φ in Q, we have that BCX |ùmustφ^ φ does not hold.
We stress that it is vital to check the consistency of BCX prior to relying on any findings
of its further analysis. If BCX is inconsistent, then
“|BCX |‰ is empty and so BCX |ùmustφ holds
trivially for all φ in Q since the universal quantification of its defining semantics in (6)
ranges over the empty set. Not detecting such inconsistency may thus lead to unintended
and flawed reasoning. In our tool, this is a non-issue as it uses these judgments within
optimization algorithms that either report a concretization as witness or report a discovered
inconsistency.
Consistency checking is NP-hard: checking the satisfiability of constraints in logic C is
NP-hard. And so this hardness is inherited for any notion of size of a constrained BN that
includes the sum of the sizes of all its constraints.
3.4 Reducing |ùmay and |ùmust to satisfiability checking
Our case studies involving constrained BNs suggest that it suffices to consider elements of C,
i.e. to consider formulas of Q that are quantifier-free. The benefit of having the more expres-
sive logic Q, however, is that its quantifiers allow us to reduce the decisions for BCX |ùmayϕ
and BCX |ùmustϕ for quantifier-free formulas ϕ to satisfiability checking, respectively validity
checking in the logic Q – which we now demonstrate. For sound, constrained BNs BCX , the
judgment BCX |ùmayϕ asks whether there is an assignment α : X Ñ R such that α |ù
Ź
ϕ1PC ϕ
1
and α |ù ϕ both hold. Since C is contained in Q, we may capture this meaning within the
logic Q itself as a satisfiability check. Let set X equal tx1, . . . , xnu. Then, asking whether
α |ùŹϕ1PC ϕ1 and α |ù ϕ hold, asks whether the formula in (8) of logic Q is satisfiable:
Dx1 : . . . : Dxn : ϕ^
ľ
ϕ1PC
ϕ1 (8)
Definition 10 For a constrained BN BCX and ϕ in C, we write ExpBCX , ϕq to denote the
formula defined in (8).
Note that ExpBCX , ϕq depends on BCX : namely on its set of variables X and constraint set
C, the latter reflecting symbolic meanings of marginal probabilities. Let us illustrate this by
revisiting Example 1.
Example 2 For ϕH as in Example 1 with type X “ txuY tmpHu, the formula we derive for
BCX |ùmayϕH is
DmpH : Dx : pmpH ă 0.3q ^ p0.1 ď xq ^ px ď 0.3q ^ (9)
p0.5 ˚ x` p1´ 0.5 ˚ xq “ 1q ^ px` p1´ xq “ 1q ^ pmpH “ tq
where t is the term on the righthand side of the equation in (3).
We can summarize this discussion, where we also appeal to the first item of Theorem 1
to get a similar characterization for |ùmust.
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Theorem 3 Let BCX be a constrained BN and ϕ in C. Then we have:
1. Formula ExpBCX , ϕq in (8) is in Q and in the existential fragment of Q.
2. Truth of BCX |ùmayϕ is equivalent to the satisfiability of ExpBCX , ϕq in Q.
3. BCX |ùmayϕ can be decided in PSPACE in the size of formula ExpBCX , ϕq.
4. BCX |ùmustϕ can be decided in PSPACE in the size of formula ExpBCX , ϕq.
This result of deciding semantic judgments in polynomial space pertains to the size of
formulas ExpBCX , ϕq and ExpBCX , ϕq, and these formulas contain equations that define the
meaning of marginals symbolically. There is therefore an incentive to simplify such sym-
bolic expressions prior to their incorporation into C and these formulas, and we do such
simplifications in our implementation.
3.5 Constrained Union Operator
We also want the ability to compare two or more constrained BNs or to discover relationships
between them. This is facilitated by a notion of composition of constrained BNs, which we
now develop. Consider two constrained BNs BC1X1 and B
C2
X2
. Our intuition for composition is
to use a disjoint union of the graphs of each of these constrained BNs such that each node
in this unioned DAG still has its symbolic probability table as before. This union operator
renames nodes that appear in both graphs so that the union is indeed disjoint. As a set of
constraints for the resulting constrained BN, we then consider C1 Y C2.
It is useful to make this composition depend on another set of constraints C. The idea
is that C can specify known or assumed relationships between these BNs. The resulting
composition operator
CY defines the composition
BC1X1
CYBC2X2 (10)
as the constrained BN with graph and probability tables obtained by disjoint union of the
graphs and symbolic probability tables of BC1X1 and B
C2
X2
, where the set of constraints for this
resulting constrained BN is now C1 Y C2 Y C.
This composition operator has an implicit assumption for being well defined, namely
that C does not contain any equations that (re)define the (symbolic) meaning of marginal
probabilities given in C1 Y C2.
We give an example of such a union of constrained BNs that already illustrates some
reasoning capabilities to be developed in this paper:
Example 3 Figure 5 specifies a constrained BN B
C10
X 10
that is similar to constrained BN BC0X0
defined in Figure 2 but that models rain with more specificity. Variables y and z are used
in symbolic probabilities, and variables mp1H and mp1W refer to the marginals in (1) and (2)
respectively. The constraint 0.1 ď 5˚y ď 0.3 in C 10 corresponds to the constraint 0.1 ď x ď 0.3
in C0 and so term 5 ˚ y in some way reflects x, that it rains according to BC0X0.
The constraint set C that binds the two models together is t2 ˚ z “ xu, which ensures
that the probability for the sprinkler to be on is the same in both models. In the constrained
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Sprinkler
On Off
z 1´ z
Rain
Heavy Light None
y 4y 1´ 5y
Holmes’
Sprinkler/Rain T F
Off N 0.05 0.95
Off L 0.65 0.35
Off H 0.9 0.1
On N 0.95 0.05
On L 0.95 0.05
On H 0.99 0.01
Watson’s
Rain T F
N 0.05 0.95
L 0.65 0.35
H 0.9 0.1
Figure 5: Symbolic probability tables for a constrained BN B
C10
X 10
that has the same DAG
as BC0X0 of Figure 2 but is more complex: rain is modelled to a greater degree of specificity.
Variable set X 10 is ty, zu Y tmp1H ,mp1W u. The constraint set C 10 includes 0.1 ď 5 ˚ y ď 0.3,
equations that define the meaning of marginals mp1W and mp1W in terms of y and z (not
shown), and equations that ensure that all tables specify probability tables.
BN BC0X0
CYBC10X 10, we want to understand the difference in the marginal probabilities mpW and
mp1W , expressed by term diff “ mpW ´mp1W .
Subtraction ´ and equality “ are derived operations in Q. The methods we will develop
in this paper allow us to conclude that the maximal value of diff is in the closed interval
r0.134079500198, 0.134079508781s, with diff being 0.134079500198 when
x “ 0.299999999930 z “ 0.149999999965 y “ 0.020000000003
mpW “ 0.663714285678 mp1W “ 0.529634782614
Similarly, we may infer that the minimum of diff is in the closed interval
r´0.164272228181,´0.164272221575s
with diff being ´0.164272221575 when
x “ 0.100000000093 z “ 0.050000000046 y “ 0.059999999855
mpW “ 0.472086956699 mp1W “ 0.636359183424
In particular, the absolute value of the difference of the marginal probability (2) in those
constrained BNs is less than 0.1643, attained for the values just shown.
These union operators are symmetric in that BC1X1
CYBC2X2 and BC2X2
CYBC1X1 satisfy the same
judgments |ùmust and |ùmay for all φ in Q. Idempotency won’t hold in general as unions may
introduce a new set of constraints C. Associativity holds, assuming all compositions in (11)
give rise to sound constrained BNs:
pBC1X1
CYBC2X2q
C1YBC3X3 is equivalent to BC1X1
CYpBC2X2
C1YBC3X3q (11)
Assumption 2 All composed, constrained BNs BC1X1
CYBC2X2 used in this paper are sound.
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3.6 Non-Linear Optimization
We next relate the judgments |ùmay and |ùmust to optimization problems that seek to minimize
or maximize values of terms t of interest in a constrained BN BCX , and where B
C
X itself may
well be the result of a composition of constrained BNs as just described. We define the set
of “concretizations” of term t for BCX :
Definition 11 Let t be a term whose variables are all in X for a constrained BN BCX . Then
t| t |u Ď R is defined as set tαptq | BCXrαs P
“|BCX |‰u.
Note that t| t |u does depend on C and X as well, but this dependency will be clear from
context. We can compute approximations of sup t| t |u and inf t| t |u, assuming that these
values are finite. To learn that sup t| t |u is bounded above by a real high, we can check
whether BCX |ùmustt ď high holds. To learn whether sup t| t |u is bounded below by a real
low, we can check whether BCX |ùmaylow ď t holds. Gaining such knowledge involves both
judgments |ùmust and |ùmay. So we cannot compute approximations of sup t| t |u directly
in the existential fragment of Q but search for approximations by repeatedly deciding such
judgments.
We want to do this without making any assumptions about the implementation of a deci-
sion procedure for logic Q or its existential fragment. This can be accommodated through the
use of extended binary search, as seen in Figure 6, to derive an algorithm Sup for computing
a closed interval rlow, highs of length at most δ ą 0 such that sup t| t |u is guaranteed to be
in rlow, highs. This algorithm has as input a constrained BN BCX with X as set of variables
for constraint set C, a term t in T rXs, and a desired accuracy δ ą 0. This algorithm assumes
that BXC is consistent and that 0 ă sup t| t |u ă 8. We explain below how we can weaken
those assumptions to sup t| t |u ă 8.
Algorithm Sup first uses a satisfiability witness α to compute a real value αptq that t can
attain for some BCXrαs in
“|BCX |‰ such that αptq ą 0. It then stores this real value in a cache
and increases the value of cache each time it can find a satisfiability witness that makes the
value of t at least twice that of the current cache value. Since sup t| t |u ă 8, this while loop
terminates. The subsequent assignments to low and high establish an invariant that there
is a value in t| t |u that is greater or equal to low, but that there is no value in t| t |u that is
greater or equal to high.
The second while statement maintains this invariant but makes progress using bisection
of the interval rlow, highs. This is achieved by deciding whether there is a value in t| t |u
that is greater or equal to the arithmetic mean of low and high. If so, that mean becomes
the new value of low, otherwise that mean becomes the new value of high. By virtue of these
invariants, the returned closed interval rlow, highs contains sup t| t |u as desired. We capture
this formally:
Theorem 4 Let BCX be a consistent constrained BN and δ ą 0. Let 0 ă sup t| t |u ă 8.
Then we have:
1. Algorithm Suppt, δ, BCXq terminates, sup t| t |u is in the returned closed interval rl, hs of
length ď δ, and BCX |ùmayt ě l is true.
2. Let c be the initial value of cache. Then the algorithm makes at most t2¨log2psup t| t |uq´
log2pcq ´ log2pδq ` 1u satisfiability checks for formulas ExpBCX , t ě rq or ExpBCX , t ą rq,
13
Suppt, δ, BCXq t
let α : X Ñ R make ExpBCX , t ą 0q true;
cache “ αptq;
while pExpBCX , t ě 2 ˚ cacheq satisfiableq t
let α1 : X Ñ R make ExpBCX , t ě 2 ˚ cacheq true;
cache “ α1ptq;
u
low “ cache; high “ 2 ˚ cache;
assert ppExpBCX , t ě lowq satisfiableq&& pExpBCX , t ě highq unsatisfiableqq;
while p| high´ low | ą δq t
if pExpBCX , t ě low` | high´ low | { 2qq satisfiableq t
low “ low` | high´ low | { 2;
assert ppExpBCX , t ě lowq satisfiableq&& pExpBCX , t ě highq unsatisfiableqq;
u else t
high “ low` | high´ low | { 2;
assert ppExpBCX , t ě lowq satisfiableq&& ExpBCX , t ě highq unsatisfiableqq;
u
u
return rlow, highs;
u
Figure 6: Algorithm for approximating sup t| t |u up to δ ą 0 for a consistent, constrained
BN BCX and term t with variables in X when 0 ă sup t| t |u ă 8. The returned closed interval
rlow, highs has length ď δ and contains sup t| t |u. Key invariants are given as asserts
and these formulas only differ in the choice of comparison operator and in the value of
real constant r.
We now give an example of using algorithm Sup. Our specifications of optimization
algorithms such as that of algorithm Sup in Figure 6 do not return witness information, we
omitted such details for sake of simplicity.
Example 4 For constrained BN BC0X0 of Figure 2, SuppmpW , δ, BC0X0q terminates for δ “
0.000000001 with output r0.663714282364, 0.663714291751s. The value 0.663714282364 is
attained when x equals 0.299999999188.
An algorithm Infpt, δ, BCXq is defined in Figure 7. It assumes that BCX is consistent and
that inf t| t |u is a subset of R`0 and contains a positive real – conditions we will weaken
below. In that case, it terminates and returns a closed interval rl, hs such that inf t| t |u is in
rl, hs. We prove this formally:
Theorem 5 Let BCX be a consistent constrained BN and δ ą 0. Let t| t |u Ď R`0 contain a
positive real. Then we have:
1. Algorithm Infpt, δ, BCXq terminates and inf t| t |u is in the returned interval rl, hs such
that h´ l ď δ and BCX |ùmayt ď h are true.
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Infpt, δ, BCXq t
let α : X Ñ R make ExpBCX , t ą 0q true;
cache “ αptq;
while pExpBCX , t ď 0.5 ˚ cacheq satisfiable and 0.5 ˚ cache ą δq t
let α1 : X Ñ R make ExpBCX , t ď 0.5 ˚ cacheq true;
cache “ α1ptq;
u
if pExpBCX , t ď 0.5 ˚ cacheq satisfiableq t return r0, 0.5 ˚ caches; u
low “ 0.5 ˚ cache; high “ cache;
assert pExpBCX , t ď lowq unsatisfiableq&& pExpBCX , t ď highq satisfiableqq;
while p| high´ low | ą δq t
if pExpBCX , t ď low` | high´ low | { 2qq satisfiableq t
high “ low` | high´ low | { 2;
assert ppExpBCX , t ď lowq unsatisfiableq&& pExpBCX , t ď highq satisfiableqq;
u else t
low “ low` | high´ low | { 2;
assert ppExpBCX , t ď lowq unsatisfiableq&& pExpBCX , t ď highq satisfiableqq;
u
u
return rlow, highs;
u
Figure 7: Algorithm for approximating inf t| t |u up to δ ą 0 for a consistent, constrained
BN BCX and term t in T rXs when t| t |u Ď R`0 contains a positive real.
2. Let c be the initial value of cache. Then the algorithm makes one satisfiability check
ExpBCX , t ą 0q and at most t2 ¨ log2pcq ´ log2pminpδ, inf t| t |uqqu satisfiability checks for
formulas ExpBCX , t ď rq, and these formulas only differ in the size of real constant r.
We now show how we can relax the conditions of BCX being consistent and of 0 ă
sup t| t |u ă 8 to sup t| t |u ă 8. In Figure 8, we see this modified algorithm Sup˚ which
relies on both Sup and Inf. It returns a closed interval with the same properties as that
returned by Sup but where sup t| t |u only need be finite. We state the correctness of this
algorithm formally:
Theorem 6 Let BCX be a constrained BN, δ ą 0, and sup t| t |u ă 8. Then Sup‹pt, δ, BCXq
terminates and its calls to Sup and Inf meet their preconditions. Moreover, it either correctly
identifies that BCX is inconsistent, that 0 is the maximum of t| t |u or it returns a closed
interval rl, hs such that sup t| t |u is in that interval, h ´ l ď is less than or equal to δ, and
BCX |ùmayt ě l holds.
We conclude this section by leveraging Sup‹ to an algorithm Inf‹, seen in Figure 9. Algo-
rithm Inf‹ relaxes that t| t |u contains a positive real and is a subset of R`0 to a more general
pre-condition ´8 ă inf t| t |u, and it has correct output for inconsistent, constrained BNs.
We formalize this:
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Sup‹pt, δ, BCXq t
if pExpBCX , t ą 0q satisfiableq t
return Suppt, δ, BCXq; u
elseif pExpBCX , t “ 0q satisfiableq t
return 0 as maximum for t; u
elseif pExpBCX , t ă 0q satisfiableq t
let rl, hs “ Infp´t, δ, BCXq;
return r´h,´ls;
u
return BCX is inconsistent;
u
Figure 8: Algorithm Sup‹ uses algorithms Sup and Inf and terminates whenever sup t| t |u ă
8. It either recognizing that 0 is the maximum of t| t |u, returns a closed interval rl, hs with
h´ l ď δ such that sup t| t |u is in rl, hs, or it detects that BCX is inconsistent
Inf‹pt, δ, BCXq t
let x “ Sup‹p´t, δ, BCXq;
if px reports that BCX is inconsistentq t return BCX is inconsistent; u
elseif px reports 0 as maximum for ´tq t return 0 as minimum for t; u
elseif px reports interval rl, hsq t return r´h,´ls; u
u
Figure 9: Algorithm Inf‹ uses algorithm Sup‹ and terminates whenever ´8 ă inf t| t |u. It
either recognizes that 0 is the minimum of t| t |u, returns a closed interval rl, hs with h´ l ď δ
such that inf t| t |u is in rl, hs, or it detects that BCX is inconsistent
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Theorem 7 Let BCX be a constrained BN, δ ą 0, and t a term with ´8 ă inf t| t |u. Then
Inf‹pt, δ, BCXq terminates and either correctly identifies that BCX is inconsistent, that 0 is the
minimum of t| t |u or it returns a closed interval rl, hs of length ď δ such that inf t| t |u is in
rl, hs and BCX |ùmayt ď h holds.
Let us revisit Example 3 to illustrate use of Sup‹.
Example 5 Let C˜0 be C0 Y t0.1 ď x ď 0.2u. For constrained BN BC˜0X0
CYBC10X 10, we maximise
diff using Sup‹pdiff, 0.000000001, BC˜0X0
CYBC10X 10q, which returns the interval
r´0.055219501217,´0.0552194960809s
arising from the third case of Sup‹ as both ExpBCX , t ą 0q and ExpBCX , t “ 0q are unsatisfiable,
but formula ExpBCX , t ă 0q is satisfiable. It shows that marginal mpW is always smaller than
marginal mp1W in this constrained BN, in contrast to the situation of Example 3.
4 Detailed Case Study
We now apply and evaluate the foundations for constrained BNs on a case study in the context
of arms control. Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
[1] states that each treaty party
“undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.”
One important aspect of meeting such treaty obligations may be the creation and execution
of trustworthy inspection processes, for example to verify that a treaty-accountable item
has been made inoperable. Designing such processes is challenging as it needs to guarantee
sufficient mutual trust between the inspected and inspecting party in the presence of poten-
tially conflicting interests. Without such trust, the parties might not agree to conduct such
inspections.
The potential benefit of mathematical models for the design and evaluation of such in-
spection processes is apparent. Bayesian Networks can capture a form of trust – through
an inherent bias of processing imperfect information – and different degrees of beliefs –
expressed, e.g., in subjective probabilities. Bayesian Networks can also represent objective
data accurately, and their graphical formalism may be understood by domain experts such as
diplomats. These are good reasons for exploring Bayesian Networks for modeling and eval-
uating inspection processes. But Bayesian Networks do not seem to have means of building
confidence in their adequacy and utility, especially in this domain in which prior data for
learning both graph structure and probabilities at nodes in such a graph are hard to find.
We now show how constrained BNs can be used to build such confidence in mathematical
models of an inspection process.
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Figure 10: Prototype of an information barrier (IB), photo taken from [3] , that the inspecting
nation might build. The IB would output either a green or red light to inspectors based on
physical measurements made within the IB that verify the presence of nuclear material
4.1 An Arms Control Inspection Process
Consider the situation of two fictitious nation states. The inspecting nation is tasked with
identifying whether an item belonging to the host nation, available to inspect in a controlled
inspection facility and declared by the host nation to be a nuclear weapon, is indeed a nuclear
weapon. This situation is similar to a scenario that had been explored in the UK/Norway
initiative in 2007 [3, 4].
Given the nations’ non-proliferation obligations and national security concerns, the design
details of the inspected item must be protected: the inspecting nation will have no visual
access to the item. Instead the nations agree that the to-be-inspected item contain Plutonium
with the isotopic ratio 240Pu:239Pu below a certain threshold value, which they set at 0.1.
In order to draw conclusions about whether an item presented for inspection is a weapon,
the inspecting nation uses an information barrier (IB) system comprising a HPGe detector
and bespoke electronics with well-understood performance characteristics (see Figure 10,
[3]) to conduct measurements on the item while the item is concealed in a box. The IB
system displays a green light if it detects a gamma-ray spectrum indicative of the presence
of Plutonium with the appropriate isotopic ratio; if it does not detect this spectrum for
whatever reason, it shows a red light. No other information is provided, and weapon-design
information is thus protected [4].
The inspecting nation believes that it may be possible for the host nation to spoof a
radioactive signal – or in some way provide a surrogate – to fool the detector, or that the
host nation may have just placed Plutonium with the appropriate isotopic ratio in the box
rather than a weapon. These subjective assessments should be reflected in the mathematical
model alongside the error rates of the IB system that reflect the reliability of that device.
In order to deter cheating, the inspecting nation is allowed to choose the IBs used in the
verification from a pool of such devices provided by the host nation, and may choose one or
two IBs to that end. From that same pool of devices, the inspecting nation may take some
unused IBs away for authentication – activities designed to assess whether the host nation
tampered with the IBs. But the inspecting nation must not inspect any used IBs, to prevent
it from exploiting any residual information still present in such used IBs to its advantage.
This selection process of IBs is therefore designed to ensure that a nefarious host nation
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is held at risk of detection should it decide to tamper with the IBs used in verification: it
would run the risk of one or more tampered IBs being selected for authentication by the
inspecting nation. Although such authentication cannot be assumed to be perfect – and this
fact, too, should be modelled – the prospect of detection may deter such a host.
We model this inspection process through constrained BNs that are abstracted from a
sole BN with DAG shown in Figure 11 and based on a design developed by the Arms Control
Verification Research group at AWE. This DAG depicts different aspects of the verification
procedure in four key areas:
• the selection of the IBs for inspection or authentication purposes,
• the workings of the IB in the inspection itself,
• authentication of (other) IBs, and
• the combination of these aspects to assess any possibility of cheating overall, be it
through IB tampering, surrogate nuclear sources, and so forth.
The selection of the IBs starts with the IB pool size; a selection of IBs built by the host
nation, from which there will be a Number of IBs picked for authentication and Number of
IBs picked for use by the inspecting nation. Should a Number of tampered IBs exist, then
the selection process (blind to such a tamper) follows a Hypergeometric distribution and will
probabilistically determine whether such tampered IBs make it into use in the verification
process, authentication process or neither. The choice of distribution reflects that IBs – once
chosen for either verification or authentication – cannot be used for any other purpose.
The IBs picked for either authentication or verification help the inspecting nation to judge
whether the item under inspection Is a weapon. A weapon or a Surrogate Pu source determine
physical nuclear properties about the Isotopic ratio of Plutonium elements. Our mathematical
model captures a possible inspector judgment that a surrogate source would only be used if
the host felt that it was extremely likely to pass the IBs verification tests. Therefore, any
surrogate source would have isotopic properties at least as good as those of a real weapon.
We stress that the probabilities chosen for each isotopic ratio, conditioned on whether
the item under test is or is not a weapon, are not derived from real-world weapons data, but
instead reflect in broad terms that Plutonium with a higher isotopic ratio than the chosen
threshold is less likely to be found in a nuclear weapon. A bespoke algorithm is used by the
IB system on the collected gamma-ray spectrum to test whether both the Peaks are in the
expected locations and the Peak aspect ratio are as expected. If all 5 peaks are present and
the Ratio of 240/239 isotopes is acceptable, then one or both of the First IB result or Second
IB result are reported, conditional on any tampering and depending on whether or not two
IBs are used to test the same item.
A mathematical model cannot hope to reflect each potential tamper. Therefore, we model
authentication as an assessment of the Inspector’s authentication capabilities: the better these
are, the more likely the Tamper will be found, and this requires that at least one tampered
IB exists and was selected for authentication. This is controlled by the parent nodes: the
aforementioned Hypergeometric distribution, and a node Chance of picking a tampered IB for
authentication.
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Figure 11: A BN [7] which details aspects of an arms inspection process. Aspects of the
1-2 IB devices used for verification are modeled in blue and green nodes, respectively. The
assessment of cheating and the operation of the inspection in other ways are shown in orange
nodes, and authentication procedures are modeled in purple nodes. Mathematical or logical
computations are represented in grey nodes.
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The mathematical model is drawn together by the overarching question of “Is the Host
cheating?”. If so, we then determine a Cheating method, which reflects the understanding of
the inspecting nation about the possible ways that the host nation could try to cheat, as
outlined above, and the prior beliefs of the inspecting nation about the relative likelihood of
the use of each method if the host nation were to be cheating.
Finally, we check whether a Portal monitor is used to stop transportation of radioactive
material – which could be used as a surrogate source – in and out of the facility, although
we do not model this aspect in greater detail.
The probabilities used in this BN stem from a variety of sources. Some are somewhat
arbitrarily selected, as described above, and therefore need means of building confidence in
their choice. Probabilities relating to the performance of the IB system are derived from
experimental analysis of the UKNI IB [4, 3].
The size of the probability tables for nodes of the BN in Figure 11 range from small (a few
or tens of entries), to medium (hundreds of entries) and larger ones (thousands of entries).
Given that complexity, we refrain from specifying more details on these tables within the
paper itself.
Our evaluation of the methods developed in Section 3 will abstract the BN described
above (see Figure 11) into constrained BNs, and demonstrate that these abstractions can
inform decision support given the sparsity or lack of prior data that informed its choices of
probabilities.
Assumption 3 For convenience, this case study will not explicitly list or show the con-
straints that define the meaning of marginals symbolically. These meanings are included in
the open-access research code cited on page 34.
4.2 Impact of Cheating Method on Tamper Detection
We want to understand how the choice of cheating method can impact the probability of
detecting a tamper. The uncertainty about what cheating method the host nation will adopt
is modelled in a constrained BN BC1X1 that takes the BN from Figure 11 and replaces the
probability table for its node Cheating Method as specified in Figure 12. We use variables x,
y, and u to denote, respectively, the probability of IB tamper only, Surrogate source tamper
only, and both IB tamper and surrogate source tamper. The variable mptf refers to the
marginal probability ppWill tamper be found? = Yesq.
We compute the interval rl, hs “ r0.197137598548, 0.197137608314s as output of the func-
tion call Sup‹pmptf , 0.00000001, BC1X1q. The witness information for the existentially quantified
variables x, y, u, and mptf pertains to value l “ 0.197137598548:
x “ 0.000000010001153 y “ 0.000000010001153 u “ 0.999999979997693
We compute the interval rl˜, h˜s “ r5.875158e´09, 1.1750316e´08s as output of function call
Inf‹pmptf , 0.00000001, BC1X1q. The witness information is now for the value h˜ “ 1.1750316e´ 08
of mptf and we get
x “ 0.000000030265893 y “ 0.999999939468212 u “ 0.000000030265893
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Cheating Method
Is cheating Is not cheating
None 0 1
IB tamper only x 0
Surrogate source only y 0
IB tamper & surrogate source u 0
Figure 12: Probability table for node Cheating Method in constrained BN BC1X1 where C1
contains t0 ă x, y, u ă 1.0, x` y ` u “ 1.0u, Xx “ tx, y, uu, Xmp “ tmptfu, X1 “ Xx YXmp,
and the BN graph and all other probability tables for BC1X1 are as for the BN in Figure 11
We may combine this information, for example to bound the range of values that mptf can
possibly attain, as the interval
rl˜, hs “ r0.000000000587, 0.197137608314s
We therefore conclude that this marginal probability can only vary by less than 0.19714 in
the given strict uncertainty of the model.
Let us now ask for what values of x can mptf be within 0.01 of the lower bound l “
0.197137598548 returned for Sup‹ above. To that end, we consider the constrained BN BC
1
1
X1
where C 11 “ C1 Y t| mptf ´ 0.197137598548 | ď 0.01u and compute lower and upper bounds
for x in this constrained BN:
rlx, hxs “ Sup‹px, 0.00000001, BC11X1q “ r0.999999994824, 1.00000000196s
rl˜x, h˜xs “ Inf‹px, 0.00000001, BC11X1q “ r7.4505805e´ 09, 1.4901161e´ 08s
From this we can learn that
@x : “p1.4901161e´ 08 ď x ď 0.999999994824q ^ľC1‰Ñ
| mptf ´ 0.197137598548 | ď 0.01 (12)
is logically valid: whenever x is in that value range and all constraints in C1 are satisfied
(which is true for all concretizations of BC1X1), then the marginal mptf is within 0.01 of the
lower bound for its maximal value.
Repeating these optimizations above for variables y and u, we determine similar formulas
that are logically valid:
@y : “p1.209402e´ 08 ď y ď 0.0507259986533q ^ľC1‰Ñ
| mptf ´ 0.197137598548 | ď 0.01
@u : “p1.4901161e´ 08 ď u ď 0.999999998164q ^ľC1‰Ñ
| mptf ´ 0.197137598548 | ď 0.01
These results say that the marginal mptf is insensitive to changes to x, which is able
to vary across the whole range p0.0, 1.0q without having much impact on the results; the
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Authentication Capabilities
Good Medium Poor
x 0.3333 0.6667´ x
Figure 13: Probability table for node Authentication Capabilities in constrained BN BC2X2 that
is like that BN in Figure 11 except that the symbolic probability table for node Authentication
Capabilities is as above, Xx “ txu, Xmp “ tmptf2u, and C2 contains t0 ď x ď 0.6667, x `
0.3333 ` p0.6667 ´ xq “ 1u. Variable mptf2 denotes the marginal in (14). Constrained BN
B
C12
X 12
is a “copy” of BC2X2 that replaces all occurrences of x with y and has Xmp “ tmptf 12u
where mptf 12 denotes the marginal in (15)
situation is very similar for variable u. For variable y, the range at which mptf is not too
sensitive on changes of y is much smaller – just over 0.05. Overall, we conclude that the
model remains in the area of highest probability for detecting tampering as long as x or u
are large.
Our analysis shows that the “tamper” cheating method is the one for which there is the
highest chance of detecting cheating. However, our results also highlight that unless both
tamper and surrogate source, or tamper on its own are used, there are limited ways in which
to detect cheating through these nodes. From this we learn that use of a portal monitor is
advisable, as any increase in y moves the marginal out of the region of highest probability of
detecting cheating, and decreases the chance of cheating being detected otherwise. Related to
this is that the range of y gives potential insight into future work required on tamper detection
for the inspecting nation. Despite contributing neither to an IB tamper nor detection, y can
vary by over 0.05 – over five times that of the movement away from the marginal mptf ’s
maximum point by only 0.01. This suggests there are other limiting factors to tamper
detection, such as capability, that could be better reflected in a mathematical model.
4.3 Comparing two BN models
We now illustrate the benefits of composing two constrained BNs (see Section 3.5). Two
constrained BNs, BC2X2 and B
C12
X 12
, are defined in Figure 13. Both have symbolic and equivalent
probability tables for node Authentication Capabilities but consider different hard evidence
for the probability of a tamper to be found. In BC2X2 , there is 1 IB machine picked for
authentication whereas in B
C12
X 12
there are 5 IB machines picked to that end, resulting in the
respective marginals
ppWill tamper be found? = Yes | Host cheating = Yes, (13)
Number of IBs picked for authentication = 1q
ppWill tamper be found? = Yes | Host cheating = Yes, (14)
Number of IBs picked for authentication = 5q
In both models, the probability for state “Good” is bounded by 0.6667 so that there is a
“gradient” pivoting around Medium capabilities fixed at 0.3333.
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Figure 14: The surface in blue shows the values of diff in (15) for the sample points defined
in (16). The plane diff “ 0 is shown in red. Its intersection with the blue surface marks
the boundary of where decision support would favor running 1 IB authentication (above the
red plane) and 5 IB authentications (below the red plane). The linear equation defining this
boundary line is 0 “ ´0.212884507399337˚x` 0.354426098468987˚y ´ 0.16515544651.
We seek decision support on how much to prioritise research into IB authentication ca-
pabilities, each of BC2X2 and B
C12
X 12
representing a different capability scenario. Of interest here
is the change in the likelihood that a tamper will be found. We can simply model this by
defining a new term
diff “ mptf2 ´mptf 12 (15)
Variable diff is in Xx for the constrained BN B
C2
X2
CYBC12X 12 where the constraint set C for this
combination is tdiff “ mptf2 ´mptf 12u. We compute the value of diff for each combination of
values px, yq from set
S “ tp0.0` 0.01 ¨ a, 0.0` 0.01 ¨ bq | 0 ď a, b ď 67u (16)
and linearly interpolate the result as a surface seen in Figure 14. The linear relationship
between the symbolic probabilities of node Authentication Capability to that of its child node
Will the tamper be found? make this surface flat.
We can now use the method familiar from our earlier analyses to assess the value range of
term diff in this composed, constrained BN. The function call Sup‹pdiff, 0.00000001, BC2X2
CYBC12X 12q
returns the interval
rl, hs “ r0.0711404333363, 0.0711404338663s
Next, Inf‹pdiff, 0.00000001, BC2X2
CYBC12X 12q is computed as the interval
rl˜, h˜s “ r´0.307085548061,´0.307085547533s
In particular, the values of diff for all concretizations of BC2X2
CYBC12X 12 lie in the interval
r´0.307085548061, 0.0711404338663s
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The blue surface of diff in Figure 14 is mostly negative (below the red plane). This shows that
the case of testing 5 IBs for tampers is nearly always better, irrespective of the confidence
one may have in one’s ability to find a tamper. This is true, other than for the most extreme
cases when there is the least confidence in authentication capabilities when testing five IBs
(for y “ 0) and most confidence when testing one (for x “ 0.667).
Let us next explore a situation in which the inspector believes to have high authentication
capabilities, regardless of whether 1 or 5 IBs are picked for authentication. We can easily
model this by setting C 1 “ C Y t0.467 ď x, y ď 0.667u and refining the composed model
using C 1. We compute the output of Sup‹pdiff, 0.00000001, BC2X2
CY 1BC12X 12q to be the interval
rl, hs “ r´0.0282766319763,´0.0282766314489s
and Inf‹pdiff, 0.00000001, BC2X2
CY 1BC12X 12q to be the interval
rl˜, h˜s “ r´0.141568560141,´0.141568559299s
Now diff is in r´0.141568560141,´0.0282766314489s and the largest absolute difference be-
tween picking 1 and 5 IBs for authentication is greater than 0.14, witnessed when the in-
spector has a particularly high capability in authenticating 5 IBs, (when y “ 0.667 and
mptf 12 “ 0.24932) compared with only inspecting one IB with more moderate capability
(when x “ 0.467,mptf2 “ 0.10696).
A decision maker could vary the use of the above approach in order to weigh the cost of
IB production against the cost of developing and employing more advanced authentication
capabilities. He or she could also query in detail how the results of such cost-benefit analyses
might change as new information is learned or new techniques deployed. This capability
might help decision makers to balance their priorities and to gain the best assurance possible
within a cost budget that the verification regime they implement is effective.
4.4 Determining equivalent decision support
We assess the consistency of two different constrained BNs of equal intent of decision support.
Constrained BNs BC3X3 and B
C13
X 13
are identical to BC1X1 and its symbolic probability table for
node Cheating Method as in Figure 12, except that th is an additional variable used to model
decision support. Variable set Xmp also changes. For B
C3
X3
we have Xmp “ tmptf3u and for
B
C13
X 13
we set Xmp “ tmptf 13u instead. Variable mptf3 denotes marginal probabilities for hard
evidence that Initial Pool Size = 10 IBs in (17), whereas variable mptf 13 denotes a marginal
for hard evidence Initial Pool Size = 20 IBs in (18):
ppWill tamper be found? = Yes | Initial Pool Size = 10q (17)
ppWill tamper be found? = Yes | Initial Pool Size = 20q (18)
These are marginal probabilities that the nation which is authenticating IBs will find a
tamper. A decision – for example that an IB has been tampered with – may then be supported
if such a marginal is above a certain threshold th. We now want to understand whether the
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two constrained BNs would support decisions in the same manner, and for what values or
value ranges of th.
For any value th, consider the constraint ϕth in Q given by
 “`pth ă mptf3q ^ pmptf 13 ď thq˘_ `pth ă mptf 13q ^ pmptf3 ď thq˘‰
We can now analyze whether both constrained BNs will always support decisions through
threshold th by evaluating
BC3X3
CYBC13X 13 |ù
mustϕth (19)
where C equals t0 ă th ă 1u. By Theorem 1, judgment (19) is equivalent to
not BC3X3
CYBC13X 13 |ù
may
`pth ă mptf3q ^ pmptf 13 ď thq˘_ `pth ă mptf 13q ^ pmptf3 ď thq˘ (20)
Setting ϕ1 ” pth ă mptf3q ^ pmptf 13 ď thq and ϕ2 ” pth ă mptf 13q ^ pmptf3 ď thq, the same
theorem tells us that (20) is equivalent to“
not BC3X3
CYBC13X 13 |ù
mayϕ1
‰
and
“
not BC3X3
CYBC13X 13 |ù
mayϕ2
‰
(21)
Using our tool, we determine that ExpBC3X3
CYBC13X 13 , ϕ1q is unsatisfiable and so – by appeal to
Theorem 3 – the first proof obligation of (21) holds. Similarly, we evaluate the satisfiability
of ExpBC3X3
CYBC13X 13 , ϕ2q. Our tool reports this to be satisfiable and so the two constrained BNs
do not always support the same decision. We now want to utilize our non-linear optimization
method to compute ranges of the th itself for which both models render the same decision.
Understanding such a range will be useful to a modeller as both models are then discovered
to be in agreement for all values of th in such a range.
Since ExpBC3X3
CYBC13X 13 , ϕ1q is unsatisfiable, we use C 1 “ t0 ă th ă 1, ϕ2u which forces truth
of ϕ2, and compute Sup
‹pth, 0.00000001, BC3X3
C1YBC13X 13q to maximise expression th. This obtains
the interval
rl, hs “ r0.259147588164, 0.259147588909s
Computing Inf‹pth, 0.00000001, BC3X3
C1YBC13X 13q outputs the interval
rl˜, h˜s “ r´9.31322e´ 10,´4.65661e´ 10s
For the given accuracy δ, the interval rl˜, h˜s may be interpreted as 0. Thus, we can say that for
all th in r0, 0.259147588909s the use of either BC3X3 or BC
1
3
X3
could support different decisions.
More importantly, we now know that both constrained BNs always support the same decision
as described above when the value of the threshold th for decision making is greater or equal
to 0.2592, say.
The range of th for which both models can support different decisions may seem rather
large and it may be surprising that it goes down to zero. But this is a function of the chance
and capability of finding a tamper in an IB. Intuitively, the models tend to disagree most in
situations where the chance of cheating by tampering is highest, when x “ 1, and thus where
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Cheating Method
Is cheating Is not cheating
None 0 1
IB tamper only x 0
Surrogate source only 0.6666´ x 0
IB tamper & surrogate source 0.3334 0
Figure 15: Probability table for node Cheating Method in constrained BN BC4X4 where C4
contains t0 ă x ă 0.6666, 0 ` x ` p0.6666 ´ xq ` 0.3334 “ 1.0u, Xx “ txu, Xmp “ tmptfu,
X4 “ XxYXmp, and where the BN graph is that of Figure 11. All other symbolic probability
tables for BC4X4 are as for the BN in Figure 11
authenticating the IB has benefit. Our approach gave a decision maker safe knowledge that
any threshold for decision making outside the range r´9.31322e´ 10, 0.259147588909s would
statistically agree and lead to the same decision regarding finding tampers, irrespective of
the initial number of IBs – either 10 or 20 – in the pool. Dependent on the nations involved,
and the tolerances for decision making they are willing to set, it could be decided – for
instance – that building only 10 IBs per inspection would be enshrined in the treaty to avoid
unnecessary expense and so forth. This would undoubtedly be an important data-driven
decision for diplomats and negotiators to make.
4.5 Symbolic sensitivity analysis
It is well known that BNs may be sensitive to small changes in probability values in tables
of some nodes. Sensitivity analyses have therefore been devised as a means for assessing the
degree of such sensitivities and the impact this may have on decision support. See, e.g., the
sensitivity value defined in [32, 31].
We now leverage such analyses to our approach by computing such sensitivity measures
symbolically as terms of the logic Q. Then we may analyze such terms using the methods
Sup‹ and Inf‹ as before to understand how such sensitivity measures may vary across con-
cretizations of a constrained BN. We illustrate this capability for constrained BN BC4X4 , which
is similar to BC1X1 but has probability table for node Cheating Method as shown in Figure 15.
The sensitivity value describes the change in the posterior output of the hypothesis for
small variations in the likelihood of the evidence under study. The larger the sensitivity
value, the less robust the posterior output of the hypothesis. In other words, a likelihood
value with a large sensitivity value is prone to generate an inaccurate posterior output. If
the sensitivity value is less than 1, then a small change in the likelihood value has a minimal
effect on the result of the posterior output of the hypothesis.
A modeller may be uncertain about the sensitivity of event Will tamper be found? =
Yes to the authentication of IBs if probabilities in node Authentication Capability of the
IB were to change. Our tool can compute such a sensitivity value s symbolically for the
sensitivity of event Will tamper be found? = Yes to small perturbations in probabilities of
node Authentication Capability.
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s = 250.0*(0.000333567254313619*x + 0.171472799414097)*
(0.000400681386562896*x + 0.205973332629545)**2*
(0.000400681386562899*x + 0.205973332629545)*
(0.00133627242418726*x + 0.686921064319534)/
((0.19713762029366*x + 0.0638269490499437)*
(4.01363933844916e-6*x**2 + 0.00412648402564936*x + 1.06062534386303)**2)
Figure 16: Symbolic sensitivity value s in constrained BN BC4X4 for node Will tamper be found?
in IB with respect to event Authentication Capability, as a function of sole variable x in Xx
The sensitivity value [32, 31] is defined in this instance as
s “ PO ˚ p1´ POxq ˚ PxpPO ˚ PxO ` p1´ POxq ˚ Pxq2 (22)
where terms PO, Px, POx and PxO are defined as
PO ” ppAuthentication Capability = Lowq (23)
Px ” ppFinding a tamper in IB = Yesq
POx ” ppAuthentication Capability = Low | Finding a tamper in IB = Yesq
PxO ” ppFinding a tamper in IB = Yes | Authentication Capability = Lowq
All three marginals of Authentication Capability are considered using just two functions POx
and 1 ´ POx. In (23), PO is a modelling choice that combines the states of Medium and
High into one state (1´POx). Term 1´POx accounts for situations in which an inspector
is relatively good at authentication, with POx representing situations in which they are less
capable. Other modelling choices would lead to a marginally small difference in s.
Our tool can compute an explicit function of s in variable x, as defined in (22). This
symbolic expression for s is depicted in Figure 16 and shown as a function of x in Figure 17.
This confirms that as the value of x increases, and thus the probability of “IB tamper only”
seen in Figure 15 decreases, the marginal of interest for Will tamper be found? = Yes becomes
less sensitive to changes in the probabilities of the node Authentication Capability of IB.
We can now determine the worst-case sensitivity value by computing the interval returned
by function call Sup‹pts, 0.00000001, BC4X4q as r3.5838265468, 3.5838265475s where ts is the
term in the righthand side of the equation in Figure 16 that describes s as a function of x.
Thus we learn that this sensitivity cannot be larger than 3.5838265475 for all concretizations
of constrained BN BC4X4 . As is evident from the graph, there are no valid values of x where
the sensitivity value drops below 1.0 – the aforementioned bound at which a sensitivity score,
and therefore its corresponding marginal probability, is deemed to be robust.
The output r1.17313380051, 1.17313380116s of Inf‹ps, 0.00000001, BC4X4q confirms this, and
shows that s is always above 1.17313380051 for all concretizations of constrained BN BC4X4 .
Knowing this may indicate to a decision-maker that potential deviations in the real domain
from the model of node Authentication Capability will require close attention, irrespective of
the value of x and thus of the perceived marginal probabilities of the states of node Cheating
Method.
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Figure 17: Sensitivity value s of Figure 16 and (22) as a function of x
5 Implementation and Evaluation
5.1 Software Engineering
The numerical results reported in previous sections were computed by a prototype implemen-
tation of the approach developed in this paper. This implementation uses Python to capture
a data model for Bayesian Networks and constraints, to formulate marginals of interest, and
to interface with the SMT solver Z3 [23]. The latter we use as a decision procedure for logic Q
that also returns witness information for all variables. The computation of symbolic meaning
of marginals relies on the Junction Tree Algorithm and is achieved through software from an
open-source Python package provided in [5].
Python also supports a lightweight and open-source library for symbolic computation,
sympy [34], which we can employ to run the Junction Tree Algorithm in [5] fully symbolically.
The generated symbolic expressions are then simplified using a method of sympy before they
are put into constraints such as in (3) and added to the SMT solver for analysis.
5.2 Validation and Evaluation
Some symbolic marginals that we generated for analyses but not reported in our case study
were too large to be handled by the SMT solver we used: the string representation of the
symbolic meaning was about 25 Megabytes. We performed linear regression on those symbolic
expressions and then validated that this approximation has higher precision than the accuracy
δ, before defining the meaning of marginal variables as these regressed expressions. Our open-
access research data, discussed on page 34, contains details on these analyses.
We evaluated the performance of the symbolic interpretation of the JTA as implemented in
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[5] on randomly generated constrained BNs. This does not evaluate our approach per se, but
the manner in which we interpreted an existing inference implementation symbolically. We
refer to our open-access data repository for more details on model generation: key parameters
are the number of nodes |N |, the number of variables |Xx |, and a random choice of the
number of states for each node (between 1 and 10 uniformly at random). Terms in probability
tables have form c, x or 1´x for constants c or x in Xx. In generated models, a random node
was picked to determine hard evidence – its first state having probability 1. The JTA was
run for that hard evidence, and the time to complete it was recorded. These automated test
suites ran on an institutional server with 64 Intel Xeon E5/Core i7 processors, on Ubuntu
14.04.
Many of these tests terminated very quickly. Though, as the number of nodes per graph
and the number of states per node increased, the running times increased on some but not all
tests. The size of Xx seemed to have a limited effect, possibly indicating that the additional
overhead of our approach to running the JTA implementation of [5] symbolically in Python
is not huge.
Figure 18 shows plots for the computation times (in seconds) of 1000 such test cases
against the number of nodes, the size of Xx, the number of node states in total (a summation
over all nodes) and the average length over all nodes of the outputted marginal text string
in characters.
For this randomized test suite, there was a small trend for the running times to increase
with the size of the DAG. But computations were still quicker for many of the BNs of larger
size compared to smaller ones. The size of Xx appears to have little impact on computation
time, nor any strong correlation to the length of the computed symbolic marginal. This
suggests that use of symbolic probabilities may not in and of itself increase such empirical
complexity.
6 Discussion
Our approach advocates the use of constrained Bayesian Networks as a means of gaining
confidence into Bayesian Network modelling and inference in the face of little or no data. A
modeler may thus start with a BN, turn it into several constrained BNs and subject them to
analysis, and perhaps modify the BN based on such findings. Witness information computed
in analyses could, in principle, be fed back into a BN modeling tool so that users can see a
concrete BN that would, for example, explain how a marginal of interest can attain a certain
value in a constrained BN.
The ability to represent witness information as a concrete BN is also a means of testing
whether the computation of symbolic meaning of marginals is free of errors. We have indeed
conducted such tests to gain confidence into the correctness of our tool and the packages that
it depends upon. Note also that errors in the symbolic meaning of marginals are likely to cre-
ate numerical inconsistencies, so our analyses would detect such an inconsistent, constrained
BN.
The algorithms that we devised for non-linear optimization made no assumptions about
the internal workings of the decision procedure used and its witness information apart from
that such results would be semantically correct. Knowledge of such internal details could,
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Figure 18: Plots for the time the symbolic Junction Tree Algorithm takes to run (in seconds,
on the y-axis) against properties of various randomly generated BNs, on the x-axis. We
assess (from left-to-right, top-to-bottom) the effect on the computation time by the number
of nodes, the number of variables in Xx, the number of states (a summation of the number of
states in each of the nodes) and the average length of the text string in the resulting marginal
computation. In this last graph, we embed the closeup of the datapoint in the larger graph.
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however, be exploited to speed up computation. For example, such a method is used in
the SMT solver Z3 to optimize linear objective functions. One could therefore run different
methods in parallel or even let them share information in between search iterations.
Our tool prototype interprets the JTA implementation provided in [5] symbolically, and
symbolic meanings of marginal variables may contain divisions. Of course, we could translate
away all division operators without changing meaning – to match this with the formal setting
of Section 3. We did not do this since our foundations apply equally to Q extended with
division, such translations would increase the size of these terms, and the SMT solver we
used, Z3, was able to process and reason with such or suitably simplified terms.
7 Related Work
In [21], it is shown how probabilistic inference in Bayesian Networks can be represented
through the evaluation and formal differentiation of a “network polynomial”. The size of the
polynomial can be reduced by its representation in an arithmetic circuit, in which evaluation
and differentiation are more efficient. It would be of interest to determine whether this work
can be extended to make the computation of symbolic marginals generated in our approach
more efficient.
For Bayesian Networks there are methods for learning the structure of a DAG and for
learning the probabilities within nodes of such a graph (see e.g. [29, 19]) – based on existing
empirical data. We assumed in this paper that little or no data are available, ruling out the
effective use of such learning methods. But our approach is consistent with settings in which
plenty of data are available.
Bayesian Networks have tool support such as the software JavaBayes [2], which is able
to perform robustness analysis. But this software can neither cope with the Knightian un-
certainty of our approach, nor fuse networks of different structures together with non-trivial
constraints.
Our work in [8] reported early attempts of developing the approach presented in this
paper: in [8], a much simpler Bayesian Network of a nuclear inspection process is presented
and some analyses with preliminary versions of our tool are discussed; but that work offered
neither formal foundations nor greater technical details for the methods it used. The more
detailed Bayesian Network we studied in Section 4 was discussed in [7], along with a non-
technical summary of our general approach and some of its analysis findings.
Credal networks – see e.g. [16] – refer to the theory and practice of associating a convex
set of probability measures with directed, acyclic graphs. Credal networks are also referred
to as the Theory of Imprecise Probabilities [39] or as the Quasi-Bayesian Theory [25].
The generalization of probability measures to sets of such measures can accommodate a
formal notion of probabilistic independence, rooted in axioms of preferences as developed in
[16]. The approach is based on constraints for such convex sets of probability measures. In-
ference algorithms and their approximations are bespoke for an interpretation of constraints;
an interpretation is called an “extension” in [16].
To compare this to our approach, we follow Good’s black box model in that our semantics
and optimizations reflect Bayesian inference – even though this is done symbolically. Another
difference is that a constrained Bayesian Network may have nodes with non-convex sets of
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probability measures as meaning, for example when logical constraints on variables rule out
certain points in intervals. Our approach is also more practical in outlook, since we rely on
reductions to known and tried techniques, such as satisfiability checking for the existential
theory of the reals. In contrast, theoretical results for Credal Networks range from different
evidence propagation and inference methods (see e.g. [17, 20]) to deep relationships to logic
programming and its semantics [18].
In [11], a methodology is developed for assessing sensitivity of lower and upper probabili-
ties in Credal networks. It is shown that for some classes of parameters in Bayesian networks
one may replace the Credal sets of probability measures associated with such parameters with
a sole such measure. It would be of interest to determine whether these or similar results are
attainable for suitable classes of constrained Bayesian Networks.
Constraint Networks [24] are graphical representations that are meant to guide solution
strategies for constraint satisfaction problems. In our tool prototype, we decoupled the choice
of graph structure for a constrained Bayesian Network from the use of strategies for solving
satisfiability problems over the existential theory of the reals. It may be beneficial to couple
graph structure and satisfiability checking in tool support of our approach that relies on
constraint satisfaction solvers.
8 Conclusions
This work was motivated by the fact that some problem domains have little or no data that
one could use to learn the structure of a causal network or the probabilities for nodes within
that structure – whatever the reasons for such sparsity of data may be in such a domain.
This led us to consider suitable generalizations of Bayesian Networks. Ideally, we wanted a
formalism that those who already use Bayesian Networks for modeling and analysis would
find easy to adopt. In particular, we sought to preserve – as much as possible – the manner
in which probabilistic inference is done in Bayesian Networks. Crucially, we wanted a set of
methods whose use could help us to build sufficient confidence into the quality, suitability or
robustness of models expressed in such a formalisms in the face of little or no empirical data.
We propose constrained Bayesian Networks as such a formalism. The derivation of that
concept is a contribution in and of itself, and it used first-order logic and its semantics as
well as syntactic criteria for wellformedness. But it also required methods from three-valued
logic to define a precise yet intuitive semantics for a constrained BN.
We also developed meta-properties of this semantics, including checks for the consistency
of a constrained Bayesian Network. These properties were needed to prove the correctness of
our optimization algorithms, which can compute suprema or infima of bounded arithmetic
terms up to a specific accuracy. These optimization algorithms are non-standard in that they
rely on a decision procedure for the theory of reals and in that the optimization problems
are generally non-linear and non-convex.
The marginals in a constrained Bayesian Network are computed symbolically, but com-
puted in the same manner as the marginals for a Bayesian Network – a concretization of that
constrained Bayesian Network. This is appealing as it allows reuse of known and trusted
methods such as the Junction Tree Algorithm. But it also creates a potential computational
bottleneck with scope for future work that may extend an approach in [21] to our setting.
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We implemented our approach in a tool prototype, which benefitted from the significant
advances in symbolic computation and in the implementation of theorem provers such as
SMT solvers. We evaluated this prototype through stress tests and a non-trivial case study
in the domain of nuclear arms control. The latter is a domain in which the availability of
data is very limited and where any means of building confidence into the trustworthiness of
mathematical models are expected to have positive impact on arms reduction efforts.
We used this case study to illustrate some pertinent types of analyses of a constrained
Bayesian Network that our approach can accommodate: a range analysis that computes
infima and suprema for a term of interest to determine their robustness, the comparison
of two or more constrained Bayesian Networks to assess modeling impact, the ability to
determine ranges of threshold values that would render equivalent decision support, and the
symbolic computation of a sensitivity measure for a given node – with the ability to optimize
this to understand worst-case sensitivities. We trust that the approach presented in this
paper will be useful for other applications in the arms-control domain, as well as in other
domains – particularly those with a lack of data.
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A Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
1. We have that BCX |ùmustφ holds iff for all concretizations BCXrαs of BCX we have that
α |ù φ holds iff for all concretizations BCXrαs of BCX we have that α |ù  φ does not hold
iff BCX |ùmay φ does not hold.
2. We have that BCX |ùmayφ holds iff there is some concretization BCXrαs of BCX such that
α |ù φ holds iff there is some concretization BCXrαs of BCX such that α |ù  φ does not
hold iff BCX |ùmust φ does not hold.
3. (a) Let BCX |ùmustφ1 ^ φ2 hold. Let BCXrαs be a concretization of BCX . Then we know
that α |ù φ1^φ2 holds. This implies that α |ù φi holds for i “ 1, 2. But then both
BCX |ùmustφ1 and BCX |ùmustφ2 hold since BCXrαs was an arbitrary concretization of
BCX .
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(b) Let both BCX |ùmustφ1 and BCX |ùmustφ2 hold. Let BCXrαs be a concretization of BCX .
Then BCX |ùmustφi implies that α |ù φi holds for i “ 1, 2. Therefore, we get that
α |ù φ1 ^ φ2 holds as well. Since BCXrαs was an arbitrary concretization of BCX ,
this gives us that BCX |ùmustφ1 ^ φ2 holds.
4. (a) Let BCX |ùmayφ1 _ φ2 hold. Then there is some concretization BCXrαs of BCX such
that α |ù φ1 _ φ2 holds. This implies that α |ù φi holds for some i “ 1, 2. But
then BCX |ùmayφi holds as claimed.
(b) Let one of BCX |ùmayφ1 and BCX |ùmayφ2 hold, say BCX |ùmayφi. Then there is some
concretization BCXrαs of BCX such that α |ù φi holds. This implies that α |ù φ1_φ2
holds as well. Since BCXrαs is a concretization of BCX , we get that BCX |ùmayφ1 _ φ2
holds.

Proof of Theorem 2:
• Item 1 implies item 2: Let BCX |ùmaytrue hold. By definition of |ùmay, there then is
some concretization BCXrαs of BCX such that α |ù true holds. Therefore the set of
concretizations of BCX is non-empty and so B
C
X is consistent.
• Item 2 implies item 3: Let BCX be consistent. Suppose that φ is in Q such that
BCX |ùmustφ holds. Since BCX is consistent, there is some concretization BCXrαs of BCX .
Since BCX |ùmustφ holds, we get that α |ù φ holds. But then we have BCX |ùmayφ be
definition of |ùmay.
• Item 3 implies item 4: Let BCX |ùmustφ imply BCX |ùmayφ for all φ in Q. Let ψ be in
Q. We claim that BCX |ùmayψ _  ψ holds. By Theorem 1.4, it suffices to show that
BCX |ùmayψ or BCX |ùmay ψ holds. If the former holds, we are done. Otherwise, we have
that BCX |ùmayψ does not hold. By Theorem 1.2, this implies that BCX |ùmust ψ holds.
– Next, we show that BCX has to be consistent: note that B
C
X |ùmusttrue holds by
the definitions of |ùmust and |ù. Therefore, we get that BCX |ùmaytrue holds by
item 3 – and we already showed that this implies that BCX is consistent.
Let BCXrαs be a concretization of BCX , which exists as BCX is consistent. Since we showed
BCX |ùmust φ, the latter implies that α |ù  φ. But then BCX |ùmay φ follows given the
definition of |ùmay.
• Item 4 implies item 5: Let BCX |ùmayφ_ φ hold for all φ in Q. Let ψ be in Q. Then we
have that BCX |ùmayψ _ ψ holds, and we need to show that BCX |ùmustψ ^ ψ does not
hold. Proof by contradiction: assume that BCX |ùmustψ^ ψ holds. Since BCX |ùmayψ_ ψ
holds, we know that there is some concretization BCXrαs of BCX such that α |ù ψ _ ψ
holds. Since BCX |ùmustψ^ ψ holds, we know that BCX |ùmustψ and BCX |ùmust ψ hold by
Theorem 1.3. We do a case analysis on the truth of judgment α |ù ψ _ ψ:
– Let α |ù ψ hold . Since BCX |ùmust ψ holds, this implies that α |ù  ψ holds. This
contradicts that α |ù ψ holds.
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– Let α |ù  ψ hold. Since BCX |ùmustψ holds, this implies that α |ù ψ holds. This
contradicts that α |ù  ψ holds.
• Item 5 implies item 1: Let BCX |ùmustφ ^  φ not hold, for all φ in Q. Since true is in
Q, we know that BCX |ùmusttrue ^  true does not hold. By definition of |ùmust and |ù,
we have that BCX |ùmusttrue holds. By Theorem 1.3 and since BCX |ùmusttrue^ true does
not hold, we infer that BCX |ùmust true does not hold. By Theorem 1.2, this implies that
BCX |ùmaytrue holds as claimed.

Proof of Theorem 3:
1. Constraints ϕ1 in C and ϕ are quantifier-free formulas of Q with variables contained in
X, which equals tx1, x2, . . . , xnu. Therefore, the formula in (8) is in Q, and contains
only existential quantifiers and all in front of the formula.
2. We prove this claim by structural induction over ϕ:
• Let ϕ be true. Then ExpBCX , trueq equals Dx1 : . . . : Dxn : true ^
Ź
ϕ1PC ϕ
1 and this
is satisfiable iff there is an assignment α such that α |ù Źϕ1PC ϕ1 and α |ù true
both hold (the latter holding by definition) iff there is a concretization BCXrαs of
BCX iff B
C
X is consistent iff (by Theorem 2) B
C
X |ùmaytrue holds.
• Let ϕ be t1 ď t2. Then ExpBCX , t1 ď t2q equals Dx1 : . . . : Dxn : pt1 ď t2q ^
Ź
ϕ1PC ϕ
1
and this is satisfiable iff there is an assignment α such that α |ùŹϕ1PC ϕ1 and α |ù
t1 ď t2 both hold iff there is a concretization BCXrαs of BCX such that α |ù t1 ď t2
holds iff BCX |ùmayt1 ď t2 holds.
• Let ϕ be t1 ă t2. Then ExpBCX , t1 ă t2q equals Dx1 : . . . : Dxn : pt1 ă t2q ^
Ź
ϕ1PC ϕ
1
and this is satisfiable iff there is an assignment α such that α |ùŹϕ1PC ϕ1 and α |ù
t1 ă t2 both hold iff there is a concretization BCXrαs of BCX such that α |ù t1 ă t2
holds iff BCX |ùmayt1 ă t2 holds.
• Let ϕ be  ψ. Then ExpBCX , ψq equals Dx1 : . . . : Dxn :  ψ ^
Ź
ϕ1PC ϕ
1 and this
is satisfiable iff there is an assignment α such that α |ù Źϕ1PC ϕ1 and α |ù  ψ
both hold iff there is a concretization BCXrαs of BCX such that α |ù  ψ holds iff
BCX |ùmay ψ holds.
• Let ϕ be ϕ1^ϕ2. Then ExpBCX , ϕ1 ^ ϕ2q equals Dx1 : . . . : Dxn : ϕ1^ϕ2^
Ź
ϕ1PC ϕ
1
and this is satisfiable iff there is an assignment α such that α |ùŹϕ1PC ϕ1 and α |ù
ϕ1^ϕ2 both hold iff there is a concretization BCXrαs of BCX such that α |ù ϕ1^ϕ2
holds iff BCX |ùmayϕ1 ^ ϕ2 holds.
3. By the previous item, we may decide BCX |ùmayϕ by deciding whether formula ExpBCX , ϕq
is satisfiable. By item 1 above, that formula is in the existential fragment of Q. By
[14], deciding the satisfiability (truth) of such formulas is in PSPACE in the size of
such formulas.
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4. By Theorem 1.1, we have that BCX |ùmustϕ holds iff BCX |ùmay ϕ does not hold. By item 2
above, the latter is equivalent to ExpBCX , ϕq not being satisfiable. By [14], this can be
decided in PSPACE in the size of formula ExpBCX , ϕq.

Proof of Theorem 4: The arguments below make use of Theorems 1 and 3 without explicit
reference to them. Note that consistency of BCX and 0 ă sup t| t |u guarantee that the first
let statement in Sup can find such a α. In particular, we see that 0 ă cache becomes an
invariant and so cache ă 2 ˚ cache is another invariant.
1. First, we show that the asserts hold prior to the execution of the second while loop.
Note that cache is always assigned reals of form ηptq for some concretization BCXrηs of
BCX . So when low is initialized with the last updated value of cache, then B
C
X |ùmayt ď
low clearly holds after the first assignment to low (witnessed by the assignment that
gave rise to the last value of cache) and prior to its reassignment. By definition of the
initial value of high, we have that BCX |ùmayt ě high does not hold after that initial
assignment and prior to the reassignment of high. Therefore, both asserts in front of
the second while loop hold, and we get that low ď high is an invariant.
Second, we show that each iteration of the second while loop preserves the asserts.
This is clear as the Boolean guard of the if statement tests for preservation of these
asserts, and makes the correct, invariant-preserving assignment accordingly.
Third, let rl, hs be the returned closed interval. It is clear that h ´ l ď δ holds as
required. We argue that sup t| t |u is in rl, hs. Since the asserts hold for l and h, we
know that BCX |ùmayt ě l holds, but BCX |ùmayt ě h does not hold. Let c be in t| t |u.
Then there is some α with c “ αptq. Since BCX |ùmayt ě h does not hold, we get that
αptq ă αphq “ h. Therefore, h is an upper bound of t| t |u which implies sup t| t |u ď h.
Since BCX |ùmayt ě l holds, we have some concretization BCXrα1s with α1 |ù t ě l. This
means α1ptq ě l. But sup t| t |u ě α1ptq as the latter is an element of t| t |u. Thus,
l ď sup t| t |u follows.
2. Let s be sup t| t |u. For the first while loop, we have at least k iterations if s ě 2k ¨ c,
i.e. if s ¨ c´1 ě k, i.e. if k ď log2psq ´ log2pcq. So the real number log2psq ´ log2pcq is an
upper bound on the number of iterations of the first while loop.
To get an upper bound for the number of iterations of the second while loop, we know
that high is of form 2l`1 ¨ c and so low equals 2l ¨ c. But then high´ low equals 2l ¨ c.
Since this is monotone in l, we may use the upper bound for the number of iterations
of the first while loop as an upper bound of l, to get 2log2psq´log2pcq ¨ c “ s ¨ c´1 ¨ c “ s as
an upper bound on the value of | high´ low | before the Boolean guard of the second
while is first evaluated. This allows us to derive an upper bound on the number of
iterations of the second while loop, since the larger that value is, the more iterations
take place. Based on the bisection in each iteration, there are at least k iterations if
s ¨ 2´k ą δ, i.e. if k ă log2psq ´ log2pδq. Therefore, the total number of iterations of
both while loops combined is plog2psq ´ log2pcqq ` plog2psq ´ log2pδqq. The claim now
follows given that each iteration makes exactly one satisfiability check and since there
is an initial satisfiability check as well.
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
Proof of Theorem 5:
1. The argument is similar to the one for Theorem 4 but there are important differences.
Note that cache ą 0 is also here an invariant, guaranteed by the fact that t| t |u contains
a positive real. We know that p0.5n ˚ cacheqnPN converges to 0 for any positive constant
cache. Since 0 ă δ and since α1ptq ď 0.5 ˚ cache for the α1ptq assigned to cache, there
is some n0 such that 0.5
n0 ˚ cache ď δ. This proves that the first while statement
terminates.
(a) Suppose that the return statement in the line after the first while loop is exe-
cuted. Then ExpBCX , t ď 0.5 ˚ cacheq is satisfiable and so there is some concretiza-
tion BCXrαs such that αptq ď 0.5 ˚ cache. But then inf t| t |u ď 0.5 ˚ cache as well.
From t| t |u Ď R`0 , we get 0 ď inf t| t |u. Therefore, inf t| t |u is in the returned
interval r0, 0.5 ˚ caches and BCX |ùmayt ď 0.5 ˚ cache is true. Moreover, the length of
the interval is 0.5 ˚ cache, which must be less than or equal to δ as the first while
loop just terminated and the first conjunct of its Boolean guard is true – forcing
0.5 ˚ cache ą δ to be false.
(b) Otherwise, ExpBCX , t ď 0.5 ˚ cacheq is not satisfiable but the formula ExpBCX , t ď cacheq
is satisfiable. From that, it should then be clear that the asserts in front of the
second while statement hold when they are reached. That each iteration of the
second while statement maintains these two asserts is reasoned similarly as for
Sup.
So we have that BCX |ùmayt ď h and BCX |ùmustt ą l are invariants. This means
that l is a lower bound of t| t |u and αptq ď h for some αptq in t| t |u. But then
l ď inf t| t |u ď αptq ď h shows that inf t| t |u is in rl, hs.
2. Let i be inf t| t |u. We derive an upper bound on the number of iterations for the first
while loop. Because we are interested in upper bounds, we may assume that the α1ptq
assigned to cache equals 0.5 ¨cache for the current value of cache. We then have at least
k iterations if δ ă c ¨ 2´k and i ď c ¨ 2´k. Since we are interested in upper bounds on
that number of iterations, we get at least k iterations if both δ ď c ¨ 2´k and i ď c ¨ 2´k
hold, i.e. if minpδ, iq ď c ¨ 2´k. But this is equivalent to k ď log2pcq ´ log2pminpi, δqq.
We now derive an upper bound on the number of iterations of the second while loop.
The initial value of high´low equals cache´0.5¨cache “ 0.5¨cache for the current value
of cache when entering that loop. The value of cache is monotonically decreasing during
program execution and so c{2 is an upper bound of high´ low. We may therefore use
c{2 as initial value of high´ low since this can only increase the number of iterations,
for which we seek an upper bound. There are now at least k iterations if pc{2q ¨2´k ą δ
which is equivalent to k ă log2pcq ´ 1´ log2pδq.
The total number of iterations for both while loops is therefore plog2pcq´log2pminpi, δqqq`
plog2pcq ´ 1 ´ log2pδqq “ 2 ¨ log2pcq ´ log2pminpi, δqq ´ 1. From this the claim follows
since each iteration has exactly one satisfiability check of the stated form, and there is
one more satisfiability check between the first and second while loop. 
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Proof of Theorem 6:
1. We do a case analysis:
(a) If algorithm Sup is called, then consistency of BCX and 0 ă sup t| t |u follow from
the Boolean guard that triggered the call. Since sup t| t |u ă 8 is assumed, we
get 0 ă sup t| t |u ă 8 and so Sup terminates by Theorem 4.
(b) If 0 is returned as a maximum, the algorithm clearly terminates and no pre-
conditions are needed.
(c) If Inf is called, we have to show that t| ´t |u is a subset of R`0 that contains a
positive real. Since the first two return statements were not reached, we know
that BCX is consistent and t| t |u is a subset of R´. But then t| ´t |u is a subset of
R`.
2. If the algorithm reports that 0 is the maximum for t, then we know that t| t |u cannot
contain a positive real (first if-statement), and that it contains 0 (second if-statement).
Clearly, this means that 0 is the supremum of t| t |u and so also its maximum as 0 is
in t| t |u.
3. Let Sup‹pt, δ, BCXq return an interval r´h,´ls. Then rl, hs is the interval returned by a
call to Infp´t, δ, BCXq. By the first item and Theorem 5, we get that BCX |ùmay ´ t ď h
holds, inf t| ´t |u is in rl, hs, and h´l ď δ . Therefore, we conclude that BCX |ùmayt ě ´h
holds as claimed. Moreover, since inf t| ´t |u equals ´ sup t| t |u, this implies that
sup t| t |u is in the closed interval r´h,´ls, whose length is that of rl, hs and so ď δ.
4. If the algorithm returns saying thatBCX is inconsistent, then all three formulas ExpBCX , t ą 0q,
ExpBCX , t “ 0q, and ExpBCX , t ă 0q are unsatisfiable. But then we know that the three
judgments BCX |ùmayt ą 0, BCX |ùmayt “ 0, and BCX |ùmayt ă 0 do not hold, by Theo-
rem 3. This means that BCX is inconsistent: for all concretization B
C
Xrαs we have that
α |ù pt ą 0q _ pt “ 0q _ pt ă 0q holds as that query is a tautology over the theory of
reals; and then Theorem 3.4 yields a contradiction to BCX being consistent.

Proof of Theorem 7: The correctness of the first two claims in that theorem (inconsistency
and minimum) for ´8 ă inf t| t |u follows from the corresponding items of Theorem 6. The
general identity inftxi | i P Iu “ ´ supt´xi | i P Iu shows that ´8 ă inftxi | i P Iu iff
´ supt´xi | i P Iu ă 8 and so preconditions are also met. Finally, to see the correctness of
Inf‹ when interval rl, hs is returned, note that this means that interval r´h,´ls is returned
for the call Sup‹p´t, δ, BCXq and so BCX |ùmay ´ t ě ´h holds by Theorem 6. But this implies
that BCX |ùmayt ď h holds as claimed. 
B Quantitative Information about the BN of Figure 11
Table 1 shows quantitative information about the size and complexity of the BN in Figure 11.
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Table 1: The probability tables for the BN in Figure 11 are too large to be specified explicitly
in the paper. Here we want to convey the structural and resulting computational complexity
of this BN in tabular form. For each node shown in the leftmost column we list its number
of parents (# Parents) in the BN graph, its number of input combinations (# Rows) which
is maxp1,śki“1 niq where ni is the number of outputs any of the 0 ď k parents i can have,
whereas in # Columns we list the number of output values that node itself can have. Right-
most column Table Size depicts the size of the support of the probability distribution of that
node.
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